What if the US had Never Declared War on Germany in WWII?

Historical counterfactual is always tricky. We are guessing. But I note that the US press secretary remarked this week that without the US, the French would all be speaking German. Is that right? Supposing that, following Pearl Harbor, the US had contented itself with defeating Japan, and not troubled itself with the war in Europe?

My guess is that the result would have been something like the following:

• Germany would have lost the war anyway, very substantially to Russia.
• Germany would not have invaded mainland Britain, with or without American intervention. The British success in the Battle of Britain was helpful in seeing off that threat, but in reality, the German operation Sealion to invade Britain was always pie in the sky. Germany never had the naval superiority that would have been necessary to launch, let alone sustain, such an invasion.
• Britain would have thrown Germany out of North Africa in any event, with or without American help.  Obviously, the American Sherman tanks were useful, but Rommel never had the supply chain that was necessary to sustain his campaign. As Russia put more and more pressure on Germany’s eastern front, Rommel’s problems would have got worse and worse.
• The Russians would probably have invaded the whole of Germany, by which time the German army and the Luftwaffe would have been a spent force. The Brits would eventually have landed in France, either in the north or in the south, and France today would be French, speaking French.
• Germany, on the other hand, might well have been speaking Russian. At least in the corridors of power. At least for a while.
• The UK would have been rather less impoverished by the war as a whole, because apart from its efforts in North Africa, it would have largely sat back, waiting for Russia to defeat Germany on the eastern front and for the United States to defeat Japan in the Far East.
• Russia might well have helped itself to quite a bit of Scandinavia.
• What would have happened to all the territory that Russia would have assumed control over in central and eastern Europe? That is very hard to say. Probably, it would have broken up, as the USSR did in fact break up, but rather earlier, and in a rather more spectacular fashion?
• And what would have happened in the Far East, following Japan’s defeat at the hands of the Americans? Unburdened by any obligations in Europe, the United States might well have defeated Japan rather more swiftly. It is possible that Britain might have retained rather more of its prewar influence and control? But probably, the picture would have been much the same as today.

So no. The French do not have the United States to thank for the fact that they do not speak German today.

The French do have a better claim, however, to the return of the Statue of Liberty. Having beggared themselves supporting the rebels in the American War of Independence, the French have never received any real thanks from the United States; the Americans rebels have never had the grace to say “Thank you”.

Irving on Hitler

I have just finished reading David Irving’s excellent book Hitler’s War. Unlike many history books, it is not founded on what other historians have written, but on contemporaneous records from Hitler and those around him. Direct evidence in other words.

You do not come away with the feeling that Hitler was a force for good. Not at all. But a theme one sees over and over is that Hitler was very widely – pretty much universally – liked, admired and even adored by the German people, and most especially by those who knew him best. This passage is an example:

To his war staff Hitler still radiated confidence and dynamism. Johannes Göhler, a young SS captain who now joined the conferences with the Führer as Fegelein’s adjutant, jotted down his first impressions on August 27,1944:

I am filled with the most ineffable admiration of him; he is unique as a man, as a politician, as a military commander. He radiates such a comforting calmness. But more than once I have heard him speak harshly – and each occasion was when on purpose or sometimes out of ignorance less than the full and brutal truth had been spoken, or even an outright lie. He seems to sense it at once; it is enormously impressive for me. . . What astounds me again and again is the radiance emanating from the Führer: I have seen the highest ranking officers come to report laden with problems and worries. They always leave his presence full of new confidence and hope.

There is plenty more direct evidence to like effect. It is in stark contrast to Churchill, who did not enjoy anything like that effect. Indeed, Churchill seems to have been surrounded by really quite a few people who disliked him (he did better with those who had never met him).

Is there a, “So what?” Well this, perhaps: that those who come across as nice guys can do bad things and vice versa.

Another thing that comes out of the book is that Hitler, although he had huge power, did not control everything. The extermination of the Jews, for example, was more the work of Himmler and Heydrich. Hitler’s bright idea was not to kill the Jews, but to send them all to Madagascar. Another example is Kristallnacht; Hitler had no prior knowledge of it, and as soon as he learned of it, he tried – without much success – to stop it.  One gets the sense that, at least in part, Hitler was not the cause of what Germany did in those days, but rather was riding the wave of what was happening anyway.  In other words, barging his way to the front of a surging crowd and shouting “Follow me!“.

It is a shame that David Irving has taken so much flak. His account is so much more nuanced than the currently required shibboleths.